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ABSTRACT
This study presents two estimates of a motherhood penalty for young female attorneys. In
the first phase, I utilize three different models in a regression analysis to examine which
theoretical mechanisms might explain the presence of a motherhood penalty. In the second
phase of this study, I employ a two-stage counterfactual approach utilizing a doubly robust
weighted regression. I control for likelihood of selection into treatment with variables repre-
senting the most common theoretical mechanisms leading to the motherhood wage penalty,
then utilize that selection likelihood to weight a second regression. I find that while there
is a small motherhood penalty in the first phase multiple regression, there does not ap-
pear to be a motherhood penalty when only female attorneys are examined in the second
phase weighted regression. I discuss implications of these findings and directions for future
research.
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CHAPTER 1
I WENT TO LAW SCHOOL FOR THIS? THE MOTHERHOOD PENALTY
IN YOUNG FEMALE ATTORNEYS’ SALARIES
1.1 Introduction
It is widely documented that women make less money than men do, but also widely acknowl-
edged that often a significant part of the gender wage gap stems from the motherhood wage
penalty—the lower wage that mothers receive compared to comparable nonmothers. There
are several theories for the gender wage gap, and the motherhood wage penalty is hypoth-
esized to operate in similar ways. This study extends current research on the motherhood
wage penalty in two ways.
First, this study updates our understanding of female attorneys’ wages by examining
recent wages from women early in their careers. Unlike many other studies that rely on
wages from years or decades ago (Chiu and Leicht 1999, Hersch 2003, Noonan et al. 2005),
this study utilizes the After the JD survey that collected data on attorney earnings in
2002–2003 and so represents relatively recent data on wages for female lawyers. This study
examines female attorneys within the first three years of their practice, when wages would be
most similar. This is important because the field of law has seen tremendous changes, both
structurally and demographically, as the billable hour has grown as a dominant and driving
force and women have entered the field in unprecedented numbers. This is an opportunity
to test two previous theoretical predictions that lead to contradictory conclusions: female
lawyers may suffer little or no penalty because they are highly-skilled employees in jobs that
allow them to balance work and family, or there may be a significant motherhood penalty
because the increased focus on long hours and client recruitment encourages a culture of
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overwork that childless women, but not mothers, are able to accomodate.
Second, this study extends existing research on attorney wages beyond the private sector
and focuses on how different sectors or structural configurations of practice might provide
different outcomes for mothers with similar credentials at the beginning of their careers.
While it is true that attorneys often work in private corporations that may idolize the
ideal worker, that is, someone who is solely dedicated to or available for her job, they have
opportunities to pursue other careers as well. This segmentation across practice settings,
combined with a competitive labor market, may lead to greater earnings stratification within
the law field. In particular, it seems reasonable to expect that women outside the private
sector might suffer less of a penalty than those in the private sector.
Although previous research does not establish a motherhood penalty for female attorneys,
there is reason to believe that the law field has changed in ways that would lead to a
motherhood penalty, and that those structural and demographic changes might outweigh
the benefits that often accrue to highly paid and specialized occupations. In particular, I
expect a motherhood penalty to exist for female attorneys, although I expect it to vary
by the practice setting in which mothers work based on predictions in four hypothesized
mechanisms, discussed in detail later.
1.2 Literature Review
When the Fair Pay Act, prohibiting discrimination in pay based on gender and race, failed to
pass in 2009, 2010 and 2011, one might have hoped that it is because the act is unnecessary.
However, American women still average only 81% of what men earn, and female attorneys
make 77% of their male counterparts’ salaries (BLS 2011)1. The gender gap has narrowed
over time, although it appears that this is in large part due to the simultaneous decline in
1This is according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011 report “Women at Work.”
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white men’s earnings rather than women’s increased human capital or increasing returns
to it (Bernhardt et al. 1995). There are many reasons for why this gender gap exists,
including sex segregation within occupations (Bielby and Baron 1986, Petersen and Morgan
1995), differential returns to human capital (Dinovitzer et al. 2009), and prehire sorting of
suitable candidates (Fernandez and Sosa 2005). There may also be more subtle forms of
discrimination which result in lower wages for women. Recent research on organizational
practices find that men receive higher rewards for the same performance as women, and that
organizations that profess a meritocratic culture may actually penalize women relative to
men (Castilla 2008, Castilla and Benard 2010). The gender wage gap varies by field, job
title and the proportion of women within that field (Petersen and Morgan 1995, Morgan
1998, Roth 2003), but some of the gender gap can be attributed to the motherhood penalty:
mothers earn less than their childless counterparts (Waldfogel 1997, Budig and England
2001), which affects the gender gap itself.
There are four primary mechanisms through which the motherhood gap is conceived to
operate: human capital, compensating differentials, discrimination and status characteris-
tics. These can be conceived broadly as supply- and demand-side explanations. Supply-side
explanations, those that attribute the motherhood penalty to individuals’ actions, include
human capital arguments, work effort or productivity, and compensating differentials. For
many women, the struggle to balance work and home life may lead them to adopt strategies
leading to lower pay such as fewer work hours, changing employers, moving to part-time or
even “opting out” of the workforce altogether. Women may select into preferred, but lower
paying, occupations that accomodate their goals or reflect their lower abilities. Demand-side
explanations include actions on the employer’s part such as discrimination, either statistical
or taste-based, and organizational practices that affect men and women differently. Women
may not be selected for highly preferred or prestigious jobs, they may be seen as less com-
petent or dedicated, or they may be overtly discriminated against in hiring or promotion.
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Some seemingly neutral practices have differential impacts across gender—as when attorneys
come up for partnership between five and seven years after starting their careers, which is
precisely the same time many women are considering starting families. Some discrimination
is quite overt, as when clients prefer male attorneys. Meanwhile, the status of motherhood
functions to subtly create expectations for how mothers will perform and behave compared
to fathers and childless women. Each of these explanations is explored more thoroughly in
the following sections.
1.2.1 Human Capital
In the human capital framework (Mincer and Polachek 1974), employees invest in them-
selves over time to build a toolkit of valuable skills and connections that are important to
employment access and stability. There are two threads in this argument: that mothers may
have less human capital than nonmothers and that they may also receive lower returns for
their investment than other women. Mothers may choose not to continue their education
or professional networking because it is not necessary or worth the investment of time and
money. They may be wary of pursuing employment that has firm-specific training because
it is not portable and may require an ongoing investment or upkeep of a particular skill
set. In addition, motherhood may limit women’s accumulation of human capital through
their labor supply in two ways. The first is that when mothers take time off to bear and
raise children, they disrupt their professional development and lose time that could be used
to develop skill sets or expand professional networks. The second way is through women’s
tendency to change jobs after being out of the workforce, leading to disruptions in the accu-
mulation of seniority and firm-specific knowledge. If mothers are not continuously employed
throughout their childrearing years, the disruption to work experience, learning and social
networks creates a smaller foundation of human capital for mothers to draw on. Finally,
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even when mothers have equal human capital to other women, they receive smaller returns
on their investment, resulting in lower wages.
These human capital arguments have been well supported in the research on the mother-
hood penalty. First, Gangl and Ziefle (2009) note that, although women are less likely than
others to switch employers generally, they are more likely to switch employers at the time of
a birth. Waldfogel (1997) finds that, even after controlling for education and labor market
experience, mothers still suffer a 6% wage penalty for the first child and a total penalty of
13% for two or more children. She also suggests that these effects may vary by race and
education level. Budig and England (2001) find that human capital, specifically education,
past work experience and current employer seniority, account for approximately 30% of the
7% per child motherhood wage penalty. Dinovitzer et al. (2009) find that 75% of the 7.3%
gender wage gap they find is determined by lower returns to women’s credentials than men’s,
and another 25% of the gap can be attributed to differences in the credentials themselves.
Social policy also may play a role as women in the United States suffer a motherhood wage
penalty that, unlike their German peers, can be explained by their labor force participation
choices, including how long they stay out of the workforce with employer or state-sponsored
leave (Gangl and Ziefle 2009).
These effects also vary by the social position of the mother, as Anderson et al. (2003)
demonstrate when they examine women along the distribution of education. Anderson et al.
(2003) find that the wage penalty varies by both how long a woman remains out of the
workforce after having children and is highest for high school graduates who did not complete
college. On the other hand, Budig and Hodges (2010) find that while the motherhood penalty
is stiffest for the lowest earning mothers, it is the highest earners who suffer most from
human capital reductions, accounting for 40%-50% of the penalty at the mean. Somewhat
surprisingly, research also supports the notion of a motherhood bonus at higher education
levels and the 95th percentile of earnings for women: Budig and Hodges (2010) find a bonus
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of between 4% and 10% for the highest earning ever-married women and Anderson et al.
(2003) finds no effect of a penalty for college-educated women. Blair-Loy and Wharton
(2004) find a slight bonus for the few women who stay fulltime after having children but
note that these may be exceptionally driven women.
1.2.2 Work Effort, Productivity and Compensating Differentials
Closely tied to the human capital arguments are the ideas that work effort, productivity,
or compensating differentials may explain the motherhood penalty. Becker (1985) theorizes
that women earn less than men, even if they bring the same human capital to the market-
place, because their household responsibilities leave them with less energy to put into the
labor market. As a result, women self-select into less demanding jobs in an effort to balance
their professional and home responsibilities. Alternately, women may be less productive at
work because they have spent their energy elsewhere, so the lower wage reflects less produc-
tive work time. Without direct measures of productivity, this hypothesis is difficult to test
but Budig and Hodges (2010) find that mothers in the middle of the earnings distribution
suffer the highest penalties, not mothers with the highest effort and earnings. They posit
that this counterintuitive finding is perhaps the result of workplace flexibility rather than
work-effort, as they do find that reduced work effort, measured in hours, accounts for 1/3
of the baseline motherhood penalty in the bottom half of the earnings distribution. Kmec
(2011) tackles work effort directly in her study of comparative pro-work behaviors, including
self-reported scale measures of work effort, work intensity, job engagement and work inter-
ference due to household chores or activities2. For most behaviors, she finds no measurable
difference between mothers, fathers and nonparents, but mothers report significantly more
2For job engagement, the question is “How often do you get so involved in your work that you forget
about everything else, even the time?” with responses coded from 1 “never” to 5 “all of the time.” For work
intensity, the question is “How often do you have to work very intensively, that is, you are very busy trying
to get things done?” with responses coded as above (Kmec 2011, 499).
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job engagement and work intensity than fathers.
The theory of compensating differentials posits that mothers select family-friendly jobs
that will allow them a more favorable work-life balance and, in return, accept lower wages.
Although occupations do tend to be segregated by sex, Budig and England (2001) find that
mothers are no more likely to select into female occupations such as teachers and nurses than
nonmothers and Glauber (2011) notes that women are not more likely to exchange flexibility
in return for lower pay. One obvious strategy that mothers adopt in this framework is
to utilize part-time work, a strategy which Waldfogel (1997) and Anderson et al. (2003)
acknowledge explains some of the motherhood penalty. Noonan et al. (2005) also find that
attorneys have changed their strategies for balancing work and family over time. They find
that young lawyers were more likely to work part-time than take time off to raise children
as older female attorneys had done.
However, compensating differentials may mean different things at different points in the
employment spectrum because the very flexibility and benefits that make balancing family
and professional responsibilities easier tend to be found in higher wage jobs, reducing the
need to compromise on hours (Anderson et al. 2003). Glauber (2011) points out that that this
may be in part because jobs are segmenting into “good” jobs that provide better wages and
benefits and “bad” jobs that do not. She finds that although the integration of an occupation
does affect availability of flexible work options, it is because integrated occupations tend to
be clustered in better occupations. In fact, access to flexible arrangements is low in both
male-dominated and female-dominated occupations because these occupations tend to have
fewer benefits overall. This might help explain why Anderson et al. (2003) and Budig and
Hodges (2010) found a minimal or nonexistent penalty for highly educated female earners.
For female attorneys, this could mean that they are able to have access to the flexibility
necessary to balance work and home as a function of their job status rather than the recent
integration of the law field.
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One weakness of this argument is that the presence of the family-friendly policies that one
would hypothesize attracts mothers does not automatically translate into a position which is
actually more family-friendly. Compensating differentials occur within highly specific insti-
tutional contexts that vary widely between countries, cities, employers and even supervisors.
As Gangl and Ziefle (2009) note, a woman’s choice to stay at the same employer after the
birth of a child may minimize an immediate motherhood penalty while switching to a more
family-friendly employer is associated with a 3%-4% wage penalty. In a longitudinal study
that followed a cohort of women for seven years after childbirth, Glass (2004) found that
while employers that provided family-friendly policies did not offer lower wages than other
employers, the women who took advantage of these policies suffered nonetheless. Depending
on which policy they used, mothers faced slower wage growth after childbirth than nonmoth-
ers; switching to another employer actually allows one to “wipe the slate clean” and allow
the original, steeper wage growth trajectory to be resumed. Again, this varies by national
context as American women are more likely to return quickly to work after having children
rather than taking more extended leaves (Gangl and Ziefle 2009).
Indeed, there is apprehension around utilizing family policies for fear of being seen as
not serious or professional. Access to the policies that allow work-life balance are themselves
unequal: men are more likely to have flexible work arrangements (Weeden 2005, Glauber
2011). Weeden (2005) finds that flexible hour and location work arrangements are associated
with a wage premium, but since the wage premium accrues equally to men and women it
does not reduce either the gender wage gap or the motherhood penalty. While these studies
focus on differences between men and women rather than mothers, the fact that women
often bear greater responsibility for raising children implies that access to flexibility may be
a key component of some of mothers’ labor force choices (Bianchi et al. 2000). Blair-Loy and
Wharton (2002) conduct a multi-level analysis of the characteristics which determine whether
an employee takes advantage of a family-friendly policy such as family care, flexible hours
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and locations, or cutting back on hours worked, and find that work group characteristics such
as sex-composition, client composition (internal v. external) and the sex of one’s supervisor
affects usage of these policies. For attorneys, having a powerful supervisor when one initially
begins employment shields one from the negative effects of utilizing a family policy and has
the added bonus of increasing later performance rewards (Briscoe and Kellogg 2011).
1.2.3 Motherhood and Discrimination
On the demand side, mechanisms that lead to the motherhood wage penalty occur because
employers exercise choice and discretion that constrain mothers’ employment opportunities.
These may operate regardless of individual mothers’ work force attachment, qualifications
or professional ambitions. Discrimination, both intentional and unintentional, may cause
employers to engage in a variety of practices which lead to poor outcomes for mothers.
Statistical discrimination occurs when it is costly to evaluate the potential productivity of
an applicant and so an employer relies on his perception of the average performance of the
group within which he feels the applicant fits. Taste discrimination occurs when an employer
discriminates against a mother because they have a “taste” for a different type of employee,
perhaps one more like themselves.
Statistical discrimination is particularly relevant when occupations are segregated by sex,
so that the performance of existing female employees forms the basis for future females’ op-
portunities. Because women have traditionally born the brunt of raising children (Bianchi
et al. 2000), employers may have experience with women reducing their labor supply or leav-
ing the firm, and therefore may have suffered the loss of the investment into that employee.
Employers may be hesitant to hire mothers into top positions because they believe them to
be less qualified, focused or dedicated than men, or anticipate that they may later want to
reduce their labor supply to balance work and a family (Bielby and Baron 1986, Petersen
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and Morgan 1995). This can result in queuing, where employers develop a list for an open
position and women are sorted into lower positions on the list, not to rise to the top until
the more preferable, e.g., male, candidates are no longer willing to fill the position (Reskin
1993).
This structural lack of access to opportunities, where women are funneled into jobs that
are less prestigious or intensive, can be hard to examine. However, as some occupations
become less sex-segregated, one would expect to see penalties to women’s, and specifically
mothers’, wages change as employers learned more about the new population’s performance.
Research presents somewhat conflicting views on whether wage gaps are lessening over time.
However, on average, mothers continue to face a penalty that has not changed significantly
over time, remaining above 3% for each child (Avellar and Smock 2003). This is complicated
by the reality that the motherhood penalty does not just vary by earnings and education
level (Anderson et al. 2003, Budig and Hodges 2010), but also varies by occupation.
Wage gaps vary in elite professions that require additional or specialized training. In some
fields, such as engineering, newer cohorts of women do not face a gender wage gap (Morgan
1998), while in others, such as investment banking, they continue to face significant gaps
(Roth 2003). Young physicians actually face a growing, rather than narrowing, motherhood
wage penalty (Boulis 2004). Attorneys, another profession where half of all graduates are
now female, also face a significant gender gap, although the research on a motherhood wage
gap is fuzzier (Noonan et al. 2005). Even within occupations there is evidence that this
varies by specific companies. Blair-Loy and Wharton (2004) note that the mothers in a large
finance firm receive wages slightly higher than women without children. However, those firms
that are successful in reducing the motherhood penalty are usually clustered in higher wage
and more specialized occupations (Glauber 2011). Again, this implies that different sectors,
with different expectations, may provide different outcomes for female attorneys that have
children.
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Women’s successes, or the limitations placed on women’s careers by employers, are not
only a function of family-friendly policies. Gorman (2005) and Cohen et al. (1998) both
demonstrate that the demographic makeup of the employer shapes hiring and promotion
decisions. It is not a simple relationship: female lawyers tend to hire women when the
proportion of women in the firm is lower, but it declines as women reach higher proportions
of existing employees (Cohen et al. 1998). Furthermore, promotion probabilities vary by
position in the organizational hierarchy: women are more likely to be promoted into the
middle ranks if there are already female attorneys in similar positions, but less likely to be
promoted at high levels if women are already represented (Cohen et al. 1998).
There is also some evidence that taste discrimination exists, although it can be difficult
to identify. On an unusually positive note, Beckman and Phillips (2005) find that intra-firm
relationships affect promotion of female attorneys into partnership positions. When a law
firm’s clients have a female in one of three top positions, the law firm is more likely to
respond by increasing the number of female partners, most likely through internal channels
(Beckman and Phillips 2005). Whether and how this extends to mothers is unclear, but
it is worth noting that firms may exercise their ability to “align” with clients or peers on
characteristics they feel are salient to their company’s success.
1.2.4 Motherhood as a Status Characteristic
Another facet of the discrimination discussed above is subconscious. In response to previous
institution-specific approaches to ascriptive inequalty, a cultural explanation of the mother-
hood penalty has been developed. Status expectation states are culturally-shared schemas
that people carry in their heads that allow them to categorize the world for everyday func-
tioning, but also attach lists of attributes, both negative and positive, and appropriate and
innappropriate behaviors to individuals (Ridgeway and Correll 2004). For example, the ideal
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worker status is one characterized by absolute devotion to and availability for one’s job, in-
cluding lots of “face time” at work and long hours. On the other hand, the motherhood
status characteristic is associated with unconditional availability for family and children.
Ridgeway and Correll (2004) have argued persuasively that motherhood is a status char-
acteristic loaded with perceptions of ability and role appropriateness that, when activated,
influence perceptions of a mother’s professional abilities negatively.
For lawyers, and especially those in the private sector where attorneys are required to
bill long hours and bring clients to the company, traits of success include focus on work,
assertiveness, and the ability to both network and negotiate. These traits are not only
typically male, but they are characteristics for which women will be penalized whether
or not they are displayed (Correll et al. 2007). Women who do meet the ideal worker
status characteristic are considered too aggressive or poor mothers, while women who do not
meet the ideal are not dedicated enough to their career (Correll et al. 2007, Kmec 2011).
These traits are so deeply ingrained that, even in seemingly neutral job advertisements for
lawyers, stereotypically male terms in the advertisement such as ambitious, assertive and
quantitatively-oriented actually lead to higher percentages of male hires (Gorman 2005).
Experimental and audit studies confirm the negative effect of motherhood status char-
acteristics on professional success. Cuddy et al. (2004) find that when professional women
become mothers they face a change in others’ perception of them: they are perceived as
warm rather than competent, and are less likely to be promoted. They find that fathers
neither experience this change, nor face a reduction in perceptions of their competence with
parenthood. Correll et al. (2007) also utilize an experiment to evaluate same-sex pairings of
equally qualified parents and nonparents along a range of professional criteria. Correll et al.
(2007) find that mothers are less likely to be recommended for training, hire, promotion and
even receive lower starting salary offers. In the second portion of the study, Correll et al.
(2007) find that actual employers in an audit study are more likely to give an interview
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callback to childless women than childless men, but that mothers are significantly less likely
to receive a callback than all other groups. In a similar study, Benard and Correll (2010)
find that female raters are harsher toward mothers on perceived measures of competence
and interpersonal skills than male participants, perhaps providing some insight into how
within-firm promotions are influenced. Apparently, the increased integration of occupations
may have drawbacks as well as benefits for women.
1.2.5 Lawyers and the Motherhood Penalty
Lawyers are a logical choice to study the effects of motherhood on wages for three reasons.
First, an extensive body of research already exists on lawyers and gender, laying a foundation
for what we can expect from this analysis and allowing us to compare a recent estimate of
the motherhood penalty for attorneys against older estimates. The primary focus of gender
research on attorneys has focused on wages, although mobility and segregation by area of
practice have also been studied. In general, research demonstrates that female attorneys
earn substantially less than men (Chiu and Leicht 1999, Hersch 2003, Noonan et al. 2005,
Dinovitzer et al. 2009). According to Noonan et al. (2005), these differences in top tier
law school graduates’ earnings, particularly those of mothers, can be fully explained by
demographic and labor participation variables. Similarly, Hersch (2003) finds that there is
no motherhood penalty, although fathers receive a fatherhood “bonus.” Dinovitzer et al.
(2009) study the most recent wage information for attorneys in a representative sample of
recent law school graduates and find that being a parent accounts for only 6.1% of the 7.3%
gender gap they measure.
Second, since at least 1986 women have made up 40% or more of all law students (Chiu
and Leicht 1999). This provides a relatively long window of time for a previously male-
dominated field to become more integrated across many areas of practice. Noonan et al.
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(2005) find that although women are now less segregated by practice area, their work histories
reflect more and longer part-time work periods. If that is the case, female lawyers may now
have more flexibility at work because the occupation is integrated. Conversely, it may be
that female attorneys could not have taken time off for children previously and that, as work
practices have changed, the existing wage gap between men and women actually reflects
a motherhood penalty, rather than a true gender gap, because employers now place more
emphasis on and have more ideal worker females. Previous research on attorney wages relies
on data from law school graduates who began their careers in 1972, 1979, 1984 and 1990 and
the dramatic shifts in the law profession warrant an examination of more recent trends.
Third, lawyers represent an opportunity to study a privileged and elite profession with
a specialized skill set that is able to regulate who enters into practice. Law school is a com-
petitive and costly investment, both financially and in terms of time. Analyzing attorneys
allows examination of an occupation that requires higher than average commitment and
ability, and so minimizes individual heterogeneity of ability and drive. However, because
the field has changed tremendously since the 1980s (Chiu and Leicht 1999, Dinovitzer et al.
2009) and now relies heavily on billable hours and recruiting clients, it seems likely that
the field’s need for ideal workers may have affected men and women differently. Sectors less
reliant on these factors may exhibit less of a motherhood penalty. Even in the presence of
a highly qualified and motivated workforce, there may be stratification in earnings based on
the increased focus on the ideal worker.
These reasons warrant an examination of the motherhood penalty potential for young
lawyers. In studying a representative sample of new lawyers, this paper is able to minimize
important sources of heterogeneity: these men and women are similarly trained, enter the
labor market at similar times, are in a field with barriers to entry and high occupational
closure, are invested in education beyond college, and are within a relatively narrow age
range. We have competing hypotheses that women with higher education and earnings
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may actually earn a motherhood bonus, while status characteristics lead us to expect that
mothers who are lawyers may face great pressure to conform to the ideal worker status and
may be punished if they don’t. Finally, because lawyers can practice in such a wide range
of settings, it seems reasonable that, if the motherhood penalty exists, different institutional
settings may create different patterns of disadvantage for women and mothers.
1.3 Method
1.3.1 Model
There are two phases to this study. In the first phase, I examine whether there is evidence of
a motherhood penalty by modeling three of the proposed mechanisms in a standard multiple
regression. I utilize the full sample of male and female attorneys and examine the effects
of human capital, practice setting and compensating differentials on expected earnings of
attorneys. These regressions are clustered by the survey strata to provide robust standard
errors and a more accurate measure of whether there is evidence of a motherhood penalty.
In the second phase of this study, I will estimate the effect of a binary treatment variable—
the presence of children—on female attorneys’ wages using a counterfactual inference ap-
proach by employing a two-stage process that adjusts for the factors that I expect to impact
wages both directly and indirectly (see Appendix C for more information on the counterfac-
tual approach to causal inference). Least squares regression allows the researcher to estimate
the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, but only by observ-
ing the outcomes of people who have already received treatment, i.e., mothers. This assumes
that those in the treatment group and those in the control group are exactly the same, when
often there is good reason to believe that they are not. It seems reasonable that lawyers who
pursue high-power career might be different from lawyers who are very similar but do not
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pursue that path. In the current sample, mothers may be significantly different from non-
mothers in important ways and this scenario is highly likely. However, in order to estimate
a causal effect, we must be able to assume that the treatment has been random—or group
individuals in ways that makes the treatment random. Obviously, we cannot assume that
the treatment selection (in this study the decision to have children) is randomly distributed
across the population, nor can we distribute mothers easily and evenly across groups strati-
fied by individual characteristics so we can see motherhood as a random treatment (Morgan
and Winship 2007). In other words, women neither get pregnant at random, nor are the va-
riety of characteristics that would allow us to distribute mothers and nonmothers randomly
across groups we assign readily available in the observable data. In order to estimate the
causal effect of children on earnings, I must model the likelihood of individuals selecting
into the treatment (i.e., having children) and subsequently model the impact of children on
earnings itself.
To do so, I present a doubly robust weighted regression in the second phase of analysis.
This is a two-stage process in which selection into treatment is modeled in the first phase and
then the resulting propensity scores are used to weight the second phase full regression of
independent variables on the outcome. This prevents me from assuming that the estimated
relationship between children and wages found in the previous regressions is what all women
would face (i.e., the average treatment effect or ATE). In the first stage, I employ a logistic
regression with a binary outcome (presence of children or not) and variables that block the
indirect paths between the treatment and outcome, leaving only the direct path between
children and wages to be estimated. These “backdoor path” variables include many, but
not all, of the variables included in the previous regression models. The results of the logit
regression are propensity scores, or the likelihood of any individual being in the treatment
group, and these are utilized to create new weights. The weights are calculated by taking the
propensity score, p1, and utilizing one of two formulas. To calculate the average treatment
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for the treated weight (ATT), the treatment group’s sample weights are left unadjusted, while
the control group’s survey weight is replace by the survey weight * (p1/(1-p1)). Similarly,
the average treatment for the control weight (ATC) is created by leaving the control group’s
survey weights as they are, and replacing the treatment group’s weights with the survey
weight * ((1-p1)/p1). These two different weights are assigned to each individual to ensure
that I am capturing the effect of selection into treatment on the outcome.
The ATT and ATC weights act as survey weights to weight the sample control and
treatment populations so that they are representative of their counterparts (Morgan and
Todd 2008). This allows us to estimate what it would look like if the treatment group had
not received the treatment and, vice versa, if the control group had received the treatment.
Because the ATT weights are constructed so that actual mothers retain their survey sample
weights and potential mothers are assigned weights that are created by multiplying the
original survey sample weights by their propensity to have children, those that are highly
likely to have children are weighted more heavily while those that are least likely to have
children are weighted more lightly. The result is that the control group, nonmothers, is
weighted so that it represents or mirrors the treatment group (mothers). The same process
is used to construct the ATC weights, but in reverse, so that the control group is left with
their original sample weights, while the treatment group has new weights assigned that merge
the survey weights with their propensity not to have children, causing the control group to
mirror the treatment group in their distribution across relevant characteristics. Once these
weights are constructed, the data is checked for balance by comparing the weighted means
of variables between control and treatment groups.
If the ATT and ATC weights are specified and constructed correctly, the weighted means
should be very similar. This similarity indicates that the data has been balanced, or dis-
tributed, across variables relevant to individuals’ selection into treatment well enough that
treatment assignment can be interpreted as random. In this case, the ATE may actually
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be a measure of the average causal effect of the treatment across both control (nonmother)
and treatment (mother) groups rather than simply the effect of children on mothers’ wages
(Morgan and Todd 2008). If the ATT and ATC weight do not provide comparable means be-
tween the control and treatment group, the ATE may be impossible to determine. However,
it may still be possible to identify a treatment estimate for either the control or treatment
group.
In the second stage, after constructing the propensity weights and balancing the data,
I will present the full regression model. The doubly robust regression model regresses the
outcome on treatment variable, the variables used in the construction of the propensity
weights, and other independent variables that were not used in the first stage logit model.
These additional variables are used in the second stage, but not the first, because they have
a relationship to the dependent variable that is independent of the treatment variable and
outcome—they were not on a “backdoor path” between the treatment variable and outcome.
The re-use of the variables first utilized in the logit specifications helps to further balance
the data across variables and account for any data sparseness (Morgan and Todd 2008). The
full regression is carried out on the full sample and also on the common support portion
of the sample, or the portion of the sample that has overlapping predicted probabilities of
being in the treatment group3.
1.3.2 Data
The After the JD study (hereafter referred to as AJD) is the first large-scale study to be
conducted around the careers of American lawyers. It was designed to track the careers of a
nationally representative sample of recent graduates from law school through the first seven
years of their career. Conducted by the American Bar Foundation and other organizations,
3See Figure B.1 in appendix for a visual representation of the predicted probability overlaps between the
control and treatment groups.
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the longitudinal study was designed to capture trends across field and practice settings, but
also to highlight the personal changes and work-life balances that attorneys faced as they
moved through the early parts of their careers into family life cycles and beyond. This data
include measures on a range of topics. Family and demographic characteristics, extensive
professional histories, earnings and educational paths are all captured. In addition, there
are a variety of measures on health and wellbeing, happiness, social connection and political
affiliations and activities. Interviews were conducted primarily through the mail and over
the telephone, although web interviews were also collected.
The AJD study is a complex survey, where new attorneys were sampled randomly from
19 different geographic regions representing major, large and smaller law markets. Fielded
in 2002-2003, the first wave of the AJD data (AJD1) is a snapshot of 4,538 respondents
who were admitted to the bar in 2000, regardless of whether they were a practicing attorney
at the time. This is 71% of the individuals who could be located and over 50% of the full
sample. AJD1 included an oversample of minorities to ensure adequate representation for
statistical analyses.
This analysis utilizes a sample of 3,145 attorneys for the first phase multiple regressions
and 1,450 female attorneys in the second phase weighted regressions. It only includes re-
spondents who graduated from law school in 1998, 1999 or 2000 to minimize the number of
attorneys who are currently employed in a clerkship or otherwise not yet settled into a po-
sition. It also only includes attorneys that are currently engaged in the workforce, although
not all are full-time, and no solo practitioners are included.
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1.3.3 Measures
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the natural log of annual salary. This measure is taken from
respondents’ self-report of their annual wages. For professionals, it is appropriate to use
annual salary and to transform them with a natural log function (Morgan and Arthur 2005)
rather than a measure of hourly wages.
Treatment Variable
The survey does not include measures of fertility history, but rather “How many children
live with you for a significant part of the year?” and this is used to construct the parenthood
variable. If respondents listed children, I assumed the respondent provided the primary
residence and care. For this measure, 1 indicates that children are present and 0 indicates
that children are not present.
Independent Variables
Compensating Differentials
Performance is measured by hours worked in the previous week and the hours expected to
work every week. The questions read “How many hours did you actually work last week,
even if it was atypical?” and “How many hours are you expected to work during a typical
week at your job?”. In order to facilitate comparison to the dependent variable, the hours
are logged (Morgan and Arthur 2005) in the full regressions, but a continuous measure is
used in the initial logit. There is an indicator variable for whether or not the respondent was
on vacation the previous week and also an indicator for full-time employment that reflects
official status at the place of employment rather than hours worked.
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Practice Setting and Organizational Structure
Practice characteristics are measured in several different ways. Indicator variables are con-
structed for sector of practice. Solo practitioners are excluded from the sample because of the
unique nature of being self-employed. A public sector employment indicator includes federal
government (including judiciary) and state or local government (including judiciary). Legal
services or public defender are one indicator, and the nonprofit indicator includes public
interest groups, nonprofit organizations and educational institutions. The indicator variable
for in-house employment includes professional firms, business or industry, or labor union or
trade association. Private law firms are the reference group. There are interactions for each
sector of practice and the presence of children in the household. Wage structure is mea-
sured by a dichotomous variable indicating whether the primary employer’s wage structure
is straight salary (0) or salary and bonus (1). In addition, there are indicators for whether
the location is a major, large, or smaller law market. Finally, a discrimination index (0-4)
measures whether a respondent feels that they have faced discrimination at their employer4.
Human Capital: Experience and Training
These measures tap law-specific experience that might affect one’s wages. Dummies for
the year that the respondent graduated from law school serve as a proxy for experience
as a lawyer. In addition, there is an indicator of whether the respondent went directly to
law school from their undergraduate degree. Finally, there are two categorical variables for
whether or not the respondent was a member of a law review or participated in moot court,
and indicating their level of involvement. Training is measured by dichotomous variables
that indicate whether a respond attended a top 20 or top 100 law school. In addition, an
indicator for whether the individual is considered a specialist in a particular area of law
4This includes missing out on a desirable assignment or having a client request someone other than the
respondent handle an assignment.
21
identifies a potential premium on expertise.
Personal and Family Characteristics
The sample is composed of both male and female attorneys, although the second phase
weighted regression only utilizes female attorneys. Age is measured by birth year, and
race is measured by a series of dichotomous variables for White, Black, Hispanic, Asian,
and Other. White is the reference group. Marital status is measured in a series of binary
indicators for married (including remarried), cohabiting (including domestic partnerships),
and separated, with single as the reference group.
1.3.4 Missing Values
The AJD1 study has a full sample of 4,538 respondents. All solo practitioners were excluded
(n=143), as well as those individuals who are out of the workforce (n=2). However, even with
the high response rate of 71% obtained by mail, phone and web-based interviews (Dinovitzer
et al. 2009), there are still a significant number of missing values for key indicators of interest.
All missing values were examined for patterns by potential predictor variables, and no strong
correlations were found. Data appears to be missing at random. All observations that were
missing the dependent variable, annual salary, (n=634) were dropped. With remaining data,
observations were dropped if they were missing hours worked and expected per week (n=440),
practice setting (n=129), and other key variables such as sex and marital status. The final
sample size of attorneys is 3,145 for the first multiple regression results presented, and 1,450
female attorneys for weighted regression5.
5The data were also checked for issues of multicollinearity and influential observations. No evidence of
multicollinearity was found. Regressions were run with and without the potentially influential data points
and no significant differences were detected. See A.2 in appendix for results of regressions with and without
potentially influential observations.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 displays the means and standard deviations for variables used in both the initial
and second stage of the weighted regression. Mothers make an average of just over $74,000
per year, while female nonparents make significantly more at $84,501. Fathers and male
nonparents, while not signficantly different from each other at just over $92,000 per year,
make significantly more than women. Mothers and fathers are both approximately three
years older, on average, than their childless counterparts, although they are not signficantly
different from each other. Compared to other races, Asians are more likely to be nonparents
than parents. Parents are significantly more likely to be married than nonparents, and while
very small numbers of attorneys are cohabiting, women are slightly more likely to do so than
men.
Human capital also reflects some differences between these groups. Fathers are signifi-
cantly more likely to report that they are considered specialists in their practice than either
male nonparents or mothers, but there is no significant difference between mothers and fe-
male nonparents. Parents are significantly less likely to have attended a top 20 law school,
but everyone was similarly likely to have attended a top 100 law school. As would be ex-
pected, mothers and fathers are significantly less likely than their childless peers to have
gone directly to law school from their undergraduate institution. All groups are equally
likely to have graduated in any given year. No group was more likely than any other to have
participated in moot court, the law review, or to have changed positions within the first
three years of their practice.
Surprisingly, there do not seem to be many major differences between men and women,
and parents and nonparents when considering organizational setting. Perhaps most supris-
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Table 1.1: Means by Gender and Parental Status
Female Mothers Male Fathers
Nonparents Nonparents
MeanS.D. MeanS.D. MeanS.D. MeanS.D.
Annual Earnings †!% 84.5 (45.3) 74.3 (52.4) 92.5 (51.3) 92.2 (51.8)
(in Thousands)
Ln(Earnings) † ! % 11.22(0.50) 11.07(0.52) 11.31(0.49) 11.31(0.50)
Hrs Worked † ∗ ! % 47.83(12.75) 42.85(12.84) 49.70(13.83) 48.06(13.40)
Ln(Hrs Worked) † ! % 3.80 (0.51) 3.64 (0.71) 3.82 (0.60) 3.77 (0.65)
Hrs Expected † ∗ ! % 46.29(9.11) 42.57(9.71) 47.53(8.87) 45.61(8.49)
Ln(Hrs Expected) † ∗ ! % 3.81 (0.22) 3.70 (0.42) 3.84 (0.28) 3.79 (0.33)
Fulltime † ! 0.99 0.87 1.00 0.99
Bonus % 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.69
Govt. Employee 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16
Public Defender ! % 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02
Nonprofit ! % 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01
In-House * 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07
Top 20 LS † ∗ 0.26 0.13 0.27 0.17
Top 100 LS 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.48
Direct to LS † ∗ 0.42 0.26 0.43 0.25
1999 LS graduate 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.36
1998 LS graduate 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Law Review 0.75 (0.87) 0.65 (0.84) 0.69 (0.84) 0.62 (0.83)
Moot Court 0.45 (0.65) 0.50 (0.68) 0.46 (0.62) 0.46 (0.63)
First Position 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.60
Age † ∗ 30.23(4.53) 33.92(6.08) 30.24(4.18) 33.69(5.40)
White † ∗ % 0.65 0.73 0.71 0.78
Black ! % 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.06
Hispanic 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.06
Asian † ∗ 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.04
Other 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06
Married † ∗ ! 0.39 0.83 0.42 0.95
Cohabiting % 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01
Separated † ! % 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.03
Vacation % 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.10
Specialist * ! 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.49
Discrimination (1-4)! % 0.61 (0.98) 0.69 (1.05) 0.24 (0.60) 0.23 (0.60)
Large law market 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25
Major law market † ∗ 0.44 0.22 0.40 0.20
Small law market † ∗ % 0.32 0.54 0.37 0.56
N 1180 270 1191 504
† Mothers v Female Nonparents difference significant at p < .05
∗ Fathers v Male Nonparents difference signficant at p < .05
! Fathers v Mothers difference significant at p < .05
% Male v Female Nonparents difference significant at p < .05
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ingly, mothers do not differ from female nonparents in their choice of sector. Mothers are
more likely than fathers to work in public defence or legal services, as well as nonprofits,
but not in government or as in-house counsel, two paths that are often seen as more family-
friendly options. Childless women are also more likely to work in public defense or legal
services, or nonprofits than their childless male peers. Interestingly, fathers are more likely
than childless men to work as in-house counsel. Although female nonparents are significantly
less likely than their nonparent male peers to have positions that have a bonus component
to the salary structure, fathers and mothers are similarly likely to have a bonus structure,
and mothers do not differ significantly from their childless female peers. All men and women
are equally likely to be in a large law market, while parents were significantly less likely to
be in a major law market than nonparents. One interesting aspect of organizational setting
is the level of discrimination that individuals feel they have faced, and while female nonpar-
ents and mothers are similarly likely to have experienced discrimination, they are also both
significantly more likely than men, both parents and nonparents, to have had the experience.
Measures of compensating differentials also show differences. Mothers work, on average,
just under 43 hours per week, significantly fewer hours than male and female nonparents,
who both average above 47 hours per week, and fathers, who work approximately 48 hours
per week. However, when the natural log of hours are compared, mothers still work signif-
icantly fewer hours than other groups, but fathers do not work significantly less than male
nonparents, nor do female nonparents work signficantly less than male nonparents. This is
particularly interesting because both the expected hours and natural log of expected hours
for each group is signficantly different, with mothers expected to work the fewest hours per
week at just over 42 hours, fathers reporting an expected 45.6 hours per week, with male and
female childless parents each reporting that they are expected to work over 47 and 46 hours
per week, respectively. Somehow, even though expectations are different, female nonparents
are working nearly the same number of hours as male nonparents. Unsurprisingly, mothers
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are the most likely of the groups to have official part-time status at work, although 87% do
report that they work full-time.
1.4.2 Phase 1: Multiple Regression Results
Is there evidence of a motherhood penalty? I first estimate four multiple regression models
to isolate the presence of a motherhood effect, testing each of the three mechanisms discussed
previously: human capital, organizational settings and compensating differentials. Tables 1.2
and 1.3 show the results. Because the dependent variable is the natural log of earnings, the
regression coefficients can be interpreted as percent change in earnings that would accompany
a unit increase in the independent variable. Specifically, the regression coefficients can be
calculated by 100 ∗ [exp(β) − 1]; when the coefficients are small they can most easily be
interpreted as a percentage change in earnings equal to 100∗β. The first model tests for the
presence of a motherhood penalty, controlling only for personal and family characteristics.
It seems that women suffer a gender wage gap of 9%, and that while the presence of children
does not have a statistically significant effect for men, for women it is equal to an additional
11% drop in earnings, for a total penalty of 20%. Model 2 includes variables that account
for human capital resources and their returns. Women still suffer a 9% gender gap, with
mothers suffering a total 17% penalty.
In Table 1.3, Model 3 includes organizational characteristics with interactions for the
presence of children to see if different sectors may penalize mothers differently based on
their expectations and organizational structures. When controls for organizational sector
are included, the gender gap itself becomes barely significant, although the motherhood
penalty continues to be both substantive and significant at nearly 17%. In these models, a
fatherhood bonus of approximately 5% emerges, consistent with the idea that children affect
men and women’s salaries differently. It also implies that when salary structures include a
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Table 1.2: Multiple Regression Results
Base Model 1 Model 2
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female -0.090*** (0.020) -0.093*** (0.019) -0.090*** (0.014)
Has Kids -0.007 (0.036) 0.010 (0.033) 0.022 (0.025)
I: Kids*Female -0.142** (0.038) -0.136** (0.038) -0.115** (0.031)
Demographics
Age -0.005* (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)
Black 0.032 (0.038) 0.010 (0.037)
Hispanic 0.024 (0.039) 0.011 (0.034)
Asian 0.162* (0.062) 0.067 (0.053)
Other 0.008 (0.044) 0.003 (0.042)
Married 0.017 (0.023) 0.020 (0.017)
Cohabiting -0.088 (0.059) -0.147* (0.053)
Separated -0.043 (0.052) -0.016 (0.042)
Human Capital
Specialist 0.100** (0.028)
Top 20 LS 0.456*** (0.046)
Top 100 LS 0.149*** (0.026)
Direct to LS -0.029 (0.017)
1999 graduate 0.069 (0.055)
1998 graduate 0.133* (0.051)
Law Review 0.119*** (0.009)
Moot Court 0.030* (0.011)
First Position 0.047† (0.024)
Practice Setting
Bonus
Govt. Employee
I: Kids*Govt
Public Defender
I: Kids*Public Def.
Nonprofit
I: Kids*Nonprofit
In-House
I: Kids*In-House
Large law market
Major law market
Discrimination (1-4)
Compensating Differentials
Ln(Hrs Worked)
Hrs Expected
Ln(Hrs Expected)
Vacation
Fulltime
Constant 11.312*** (0.063) (11.450)*** (0.096) 10.970*** (0.067)
Observations 3,145 3,145 3,145
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.23
Cluster 18 18 18
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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Table 1.3: Multiple Regression Results, cont’d.
Model 3 Model 4 Models 1-4
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female -0.030† (0.015) -0.066*** (0.015) -0.020 (0.014)
Has Kids 0.055* (0.020) 0.043* (0.018) 0.066** (0.019)
I: Kids*Female -0.127*** (0.030) -0.063** (0.021) -0.070* (0.024)
Demographics
Age 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Black 0.060* (0.023) 0.003 (0.033) 0.049* (0.021)
Hispanic -0.018 (0.023) 0.005 (0.031) -0.020 (0.023)
Asian 0.025 (0.036) 0.088† (0.044) 0.035 (0.032)
Other 0.030 (0.029) -0.001 (0.037) 0.025 (0.028)
Married 0.007 (0.014) 0.024 (0.017) 0.013 (0.015)
Cohabiting -0.081* (0.035) -0.126* (0.044) -0.072* (0.031)
Separated -0.022 (0.040) -0.017 (0.037) -0.020 (0.039)
Human Capital
Specialist 0.085*** (0.020) 0.096** (0.026) 0.082*** (0.019)
Top 20 LS 0.334*** (0.039) 0.427*** (0.042) 0.328*** (0.037)
Top 100 LS 0.134*** (0.026) 0.148*** (0.024) 0.135*** (0.025)
Direct to LS -0.031* (0.014) -0.022 (0.018) -0.030† (0.014)
1999 graduate 0.080** (0.024) 0.067 (0.045) 0.078*** (0.019)
1998 graduate 0.130*** (0.031) 0.134** (0.046) 0.128*** (0.030)
Law Review 0.086*** (0.008) 0.108*** (0.008) 0.084*** (0.008)
Moot Court 0.026* (0.011) 0.023* (0.009) 0.024* (0.010)
First Position 0.039* (0.014) 0.049* (0.019) 0.044** (0.013)
Practice Setting
Bonus 0.265*** (0.021) 0.243*** (0.022)
Govt. Employee -0.293*** (0.032) -0.262*** (0.033)
I: Kids*Govt 0.022 (0.036) 0.007 (0.034)
Public Defender -0.485*** (0.046) -0.447*** (0.042)
I: Kids*Public Def. 0.071 (0.063) 0.038 (0.055)
Nonprofit -0.621*** (0.052) -0.590*** (0.052)
I: Kids*Nonprofit -0.010 (0.108) 0.084 (0.095)
In-House 0.077 (0.057) 0.106† (0.057)
I: Kids*In-House 0.093 (0.076) 0.072 (0.071)
Large law market 0.202** (0.055) 0.206** (0.053)
Major law market 0.296*** (0.044) 0.290*** (0.041)
Discrimination (1-4) -0.019* (0.009) -0.025** (0.008)
Compensating Differentials
Hrs Worked 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
Ln(Hrs Worked) -0.079*** (0.016) -0.063** (0.017)
Hrs Expected 0.018*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.001)
Ln(Hrs Expected) -0.225*** (0.046) -0.083† (0.040)
Vacation 0.097** (0.026) 0.044* (0.019)
Fulltime 0.239** (0.064) 0.369*** (0.059)
Constant 10.729*** (0.077) 10.741*** (0.156) 10.385*** (0.132)
Observations 3,145 3,145 3,145
R-squared 0.54 0.31 0.56
Cluster 18 18 18
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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bonus, even when significant and positive for both males and females, the discretionary bonus
component may have differential effects for mothers and fathers. Even though women may
disproportionately select into lower-paying sectors such as nonprofits, they do not seem to
be paid less than their male counterparts in those fields. Model 4 removes the organizational
settings characteristics and utilizes measures of compensating differentials and the gender
gap returns at approximately 7%. The motherhood penalty increases an additional 1% to
8% compared to fathers’ earnings with these variables included, hinting that managing their
labor supply is one method used by mothers to manage competing work and home demands.
The fatherhood bonus remains. The final column is a full regression that includes Models
1-4, including variables for the three potential mechanisms. With these controls in place,
the gender gap becomes insignificant again, implying that female nonparents have similar
compensation for similar work to their male counterparts. Mothers remain a half percentage
below nonmothers in earnings in the full model, because although the interaction term is
significantly and substantively negative, there is also a boost associated with children that
washes away some of the effect. Notably, while the motherhood penalty compared to male
nonparents has dropped to approximately 2% compared to its earlier 8%, the fatherhood
bonus is a substantive 6% increase6, creating a 9% premium for fathers over mothers. To
illustrate, a married white mother who graduated in from a top 20 law school in 1999 and
works for the government full-time is likely to earn around $48,902, while a father with the
same background will earn approximately $53,507. These preliminary results lead me to
believe there is reason to estimate a more precise effect of children on women’s wages.
6For the full regression by sex, see Table A.1 in the appendix.
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1.4.3 Phase 2: Weighted Regression
Is there an effect of children on mother’s wages? The following analysis uses a smaller sample
of 1,450 female attorneys to estimate effects of children on wages for the treatment group
(mothers) and the control group (nonmothers). The results of the first stage logit are avail-
able in Appendix B. Table 1.4 contains the results of the three different weighted regressions.
The first column estimates the motherhood penalty utilizing the sample weights provided
with the AJD survey. The second column utilizes average treatment of the treated (ATT)
group weights to estimate the motherhood penalty for those women who have children. The
third column utilizes average treatment of the control (ATC) group weights. As discussed
in the methods section, the ATT weight leaves the original sample weights of the treatment
group as they are, but then constructs weights for the control group that cause it to act as a
representative sample of the full treatment group. In other words, it makes the control group
look like the treatment group for the factors that affect selection into treatment. The inverse
is true of the ATC: it leaves the original control group weights the same while constructing
weights for the treatment group that cause it to look representative of the control group.
The first column of Table 1.4 with the sample weights reveals a different story than the
first phase regressions. For women, there does not appear to be a penalty associated with
having children as the coefficient is both small and insignificant. For every additional hour
worked and expected per week, women have an increase of approximately .5% and .9% in
annual earnings, resulting in steeper rewards for higher expectations at work. Women that
work in firms with bonuses enjoy a significant earnings premium of 24%, which is similar to
the first stage regression and does not imply that bonuses are be awarded to men and women
differentially. Government, public defenders and legal aid, and nonprofits all pay less than
the private sector, and women are more likely to select into public defense and nonprofits than
are men. Surprisingly, the interaction terms intended to capture the potential differentiation
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of the motherhood penalty between sectors are insignificant, with the exception of public
defenders and legal aid, which reward mothers with a nearly 18% bonus. As expected, women
still benefit from investments in human capital, with top 20 and top 100 law schools netting
significant returns of around 35% for a top 20 school and 14% for a top 100 law school. Being
a specialist translates into an approximate 6% earning premium. It appears that when the
factors hypothesized to predict selection into parenthood, as well as relevant human capital,
work effort and organizational characteristics are accounted for, the motherhood penalty is
explained for young female attorneys.
The second column of Table 1.4 utilizes ATT weights and examines the effect of children
on women who have or are most likely to have children. In this model, the effect of children
on women’s earnings is again negligible. However, in this model it is not the hours that
women actually work that is important, but rather the hours that they are expected to
work. In fact, every hour expected increased women’s salaries by about 2%, but the bonus
component of women’s salary package became only marginally important. Other human
capital variables remained important, although less so as the return to a top 20 law school
dropped to slightly under 27% and a top 100 law school to about 11.6%. Practice settings
followed a similar pattern to the first model, and in-house attorneys continued to earn more
with a 14% bonus over private sector practice. Again, the interaction terms between sector
and presence of children were insignificant, implying that women do not face a motherhood
penalty in any particular sector.
The third column of Table 1.4 assigns ATC weights, examining the effect that children
would have for those women who are childless or most likely to be so. It is within this group
that we find a motherhood penalty of 11%, although this is counteracted by a nearly 12%
marriage bonus, potentially washing out the effect of children. However, these differences
indicate that the effect of children for those who do not have them would be more negative
than for those who do have children. There is also, again, a relationship not between the
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Table 1.4: Weighted Regression Results Utilizing Sample, ATT and ATC Weights
Sample Weights ATT Weights ATC Weights
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Has Kids -0.004 (0.039) 0.011 (0.067) -0.117* (0.050)
Hrs Worked 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Ln(Hrs Worked) -0.067* (0.026) -0.009 (0.065) -0.054 (0.035)
Hrs Expected 0.009*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.002)
Ln(Hrs Expected) -0.105* (0.046) -0.236** (0.068) -0.182** (0.046)
Fulltime 0.370*** (0.084) 0.352*** (0.072) 0.307* (0.111)
Bonus 0.216*** (0.051) 0.130 (0.066) 0.234*** (0.057)
Govt. Employee -0.264*** (0.055) -0.315*** (0.077) -0.205* (0.078)
I: Kids*Govt -0.040 (0.094) -0.035 (0.116) -0.038 (0.076)
Public Defender -0.539*** (0.068) -0.448*** (0.089) -0.468*** (0.076)
I: Kids*Public Def. 0.168* (0.068) -0.013 (0.092) 0.405** (0.119)
Nonprofit -0.585*** (0.075) -0.697*** (0.090) -0.516*** (0.084)
I: Kids*Nonprofit 0.062 (0.116) 0.146 (0.126) -0.104 (0.194)
In-House 0.171 (0.133) 0.131 (0.169) 0.194 (0.139)
I: Kids*In-House 0.045 (0.139) 0.096 (0.182) 0.195 (0.139)
Top 20 LS 0.316*** (0.043) 0.238** (0.076) 0.351*** (0.045)
Top 100 LS 0.135*** (0.032) 0.110* (0.040) 0.098* (0.044)
Direct to LS -0.061** (0.021) -0.070* (0.028) -0.025 (0.030)
1999 graduate 0.068** (0.023) 0.105* (0.046) 0.040 (0.031)
1998 graduate 0.141 (0.080) -0.003 (0.065) -0.090 (0.132)
Law Review 0.081*** (0.013) 0.070*** (0.016) 0.108*** (0.019)
Moot Court 0.020 (0.017) 0.028 (0.021) 0.057* (0.021)
First Position 0.063* (0.023) 0.095 (0.057) -0.033 (0.033)
Age -0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004)
Black 0.031 (0.027) 0.106* (0.044) 0.101 (0.093)
Hispanic -0.018 (0.029) 0.046 (0.043) 0.067 (0.043)
Asian 0.047 (0.042) 0.146 (0.117) 0.100 (0.051)
Other 0.077* (0.033) 0.189** (0.050) 0.145 (0.096)
Married 0.031 (0.019) 0.117 (0.078) 0.112* (0.044)
Cohabiting 0.015 (0.044) -0.183 (0.108) -0.085 (0.067)
Separated 0.056 (0.060) 0.082 (0.091) 0.060 (0.103)
Vacation 0.060* (0.025) 0.083 (0.042) 0.078* (0.031)
Specialist 0.059* (0.021) 0.135*** (0.022) 0.043 (0.026)
Discrimination (1-4) -0.021* (0.009) -0.009 (0.021) -0.016 (0.016)
Large Law Market 0.184** (0.058) 0.219** (0.063) 0.190** (0.050)
Major Law Market 0.297*** (0.051) 0.322*** (0.065) 0.230** (0.060)
Constant 10.441*** (0.155) 10.483*** (0.173) 10.532*** (0.165)
Observations 1,450 1,450 1,450
R-squared 0.56 0.58 0.58
Cluster 18 18 18
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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number of hours women work, but the number of hours they are expected to work, with
approximately 1% increase in earnings for every 1% increase in the hours expected. Again,
the government, public defense and legal aid, and nonprofit sectors pay less than the private
sector, but the in-house sector continues to net a 21% bonus for women. The motherhood
effect only appears significant in the public defense sector but again works in an unexpected
direction and magnitude: women with children appear to receive a significant boost in their
earnings of nearly 50%. While this is counteracted by the signficant penalty for working
in that sector, this subpopulation requires closer examination to determine what is driving
these unusual results.
Table B.3 in Appendix B contains the results for the same regressions, but restricted to
a smaller sample of only 1,167 female attorneys in the control group whose propensity scores
overlap with a female attorney in the treatment group and therefore are closely matched
on key characteristics7. These regression results are very similar to the full sample, with
significance and coefficients matching closely. In both cases, it is only the ATC weights that
produce a motherhood penalty, 11% in the full sample and 8.5% in the restricted sample.
These similar results speak to the robustness of the model and that selection may indeed
play an important part as those least likely to have children would also be subject to the
most severe penalty. It is also encouraging that the ATC weights demonstrate the best
balance across key variables and so may produce the best estimate of the motherhood wage
penalty. However, with the current sample size and data limitations, I am unable to achieve
a more precise estimate of the average treatment effect for all women and am limited to the
average treatment affect for the control group. In other words, this estimate of a motherhood
penalty indicates that it is women who do not have children who face the steepest penalties
for having them, while those who are already mothers may face a much lower penalty, if any,
for having more children.
7See Figure B.1 in the appendix for a visual illustration.
33
1.5 Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
While women continue to be paid, on average, less than men, mothers are often paid even
less than female nonparents. Previous research on the motherhood penalty has demonstrated
that it varies along education and income continuums, as well as by race and occupation.
Highly educated mothers do not seem to suffer a motherhood penalty generally and previous
research on lawyers has shown no evidence of a motherhood penalty. However, recent struc-
tural and demographic changes in the field of law provide reasons to believe that this may
have changed in the last 25 years. In this study, I hypothesized that female attorneys now
suffer a motherhood penalty and that it varies by practice setting because performance ex-
pectations differ by work context. Four potential mechanisms—human capital, work effort,
compensating differentials and status characteristics—all predict that the practice setting
should matter for mothers’ earnings. I provide an important update to previous research on
female attorney’s earnings by employing two different approaches with the most recent data
available to diagnose whether a motherhood penalty now exists for young female attorneys
early in their careers.
The results of the first phase find a significant and substantive negative relationship
between children and women’s wages of approximately 2.5% compared to male nonparents
but a smaller half percentage difference between mothers and female nonparents. While
controlling for practice setting seem to minimize the impact of gender on wages, so that male
and female nonparents earn similar amounts, the relationship between children and women’s
wages remains strong and negative. In addition, the relationship stays strong when measures
of labor supply, hours worked and expected, are controlled for. While human capital, practice
settings, and labor supply reduce the gender penalty, the motherhood penalty remains intact,
implying that discrimination is playing a role. That discrimination is important is further
supported as these same mechanisms actually reveal a differentiating impact of children on
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earnings by sex. The relationship between earnings and earnings by gender is clear: benefits
accrue to men and a negative relationship persists for women.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the presence of children does not seem to moderate the
relationship between sector and earnings. While practice sectors did affect earnings, the
sectors affected both genders and parents and nonparents similarly. Again, while this does
not support my hypothesis that different expectations across sectors of practice will result
in different outcomes for mothers, it does support the status characteristic argument that
mothers may face subtle culture-wide discrimination due to their parental status because
their earnings remain lower by the same amount across sectors. Additional analyses8 by sex
confirm that men and women receive differential returns for children, but still have similar
patterns across sectors for earnings. While this may mean that women are treated relatively
equally at this stage in their careers whether they are mothers or not, the same mechanisms
that are theorized to create a motherhood penalty actually give rise to a fatherhood bonus.
It is hard to believe that fathers are worth more than their equally credentialed peers or that
with comparable or fewer hours than their childless male and female peers their labor supply
explains their higher wages. Rather, this is in line with a status characteristic explanation
of wage differences, where parental status confers benefits on fathers.
The results of the second phase of analysis, the weighted regressions, produce slightly
different results. This sample is restricted to only women, and finds that having children has
a negative but insignificant effect on women’s wages for both the sample weights and the
average treatment of the treated group weights. The average treatment for the control group
weights, on the other hand, produce a motherhood penalty of nearly 11%. This implies that
if women who currently do not have children were to have children, they would face a steeper
penalty than those who are already mothers. In all cases, the interaction between children
and practice sector is insignificant, implying that the structure of sectors may not matter to
8See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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the application of a motherhood penalty for current mothers. This provides a more nuanced
view into the first phase findings: young attorneys who are already mothers by the third
year of their career may not face much of a penalty compared to comparable nonmothers,
but they certainly do not benefit from having children.
In fact, the women who aready have children, making up less than 20% of new female
attorneys, may be significantly different from their peers in important ways: they are on
average older and less likely to have attended a top 20 law school, and are more likely to
have previous work experience. This may help explain why the second phase finds that, if
pregnancy were random among the population, women who are currently not mothers would
face significant penalties. The weighted regression does not provide insight into why this
penalty would occur, but further studies utilizing the longitudinal nature of this dataset may
parse out whether the motherhood penalty occurs for those women who are currently not
mothers but become mothers, and under what circumstances the motherhood penalty exists
for female attorneys.
The presence of a fatherhood bonus in initial regression models should be explored in
future research. Fathers who are attorneys may be quite different than mothers who are
attorneys—they may be more likely to have a stay-at-home wife, may receive higher rewards
for the same effort or human capital, or they may choose to handle their work-life balance
differently. It is also possible, as the status characteristics literature observes, that fathers
receive benefits from the status of parenthood that mothers do not, even if mothers are
not penalized for having children. For each of these reasons, an examination of what factors
contribute to the increased returns to men for traits similar to their female peers is important
to understanding earning inequalities.
In addition, further exploration of the findings from the second phase weighted regression
that nonmothers would face the steepest penalties is both possible and important. Utilizing
the longitudinal nature of the data, researchers can explore whether those women who are
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currently not mothers but do become mothers face the penalties predicted in the model. It
is important to explore the mechanisms that lead to the motherhood penalty for mothers
later in their careers because there is strong theoretical grounding for predicting a penalty,
and implications if one is not found. Finally, Leicht (2008) also presents another interest-
ing approach to examining the motherhood penalty that might be appropriate for attorneys.
Rather than examining between groups at the mean, quintile regression that examines attor-
neys along the continuum of earnings might provide more insight into a possible motherhood
penalty. The law field is stratified by earnings, and has become more so in the last 20 years,
so it is possible that the mechanisms that theory posits will affect mothers’ wages operate
differently along the earnings continuum of female attorneys’ salaries.
This study examines the presence of a motherhood penalty for young female attorneys
utilizing information available the After the JD study, which includes self-reported informa-
tion on wages, qualifications, hours worked and other individual characteristics. While these
measures can capture individual variation, it is difficult to capture how the variation across
employers and sectors of practice affects individual outcomes. Additional factors such as
individual ambition and capabilities are only imperfectly captured by measures such as the
ranking of one’s law school. In addition, there are many important and individual reasons
that lead individuals to have children that may not be not captured by the selection model
employed and that would impact mothers’ and others’ wages. The analyses presented are
limited by these factors and so might underrepresent the true extent to which earnings reflect
gender and parental practices, characteristics and choices.
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APPENDIX A
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
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Table A.1: Multiple Regression Results by Sex
Full Sample Women only Men only
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female -0.02 (0.014)
Has Kids 0.066** (0.019) -0.014 (0.024) 0.078*** (0.018)
I: Kids*Female -0.07* (0.024)
Demographics
Age 0 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
Black 0.049* (0.021) 0.044† (0.022) 0.067* (0.029)
Hispanic -0.02 (0.023) 0.003 (0.020) -0.039 (0.039)
Asian 0.035 (0.032) 0.042 (0.051) 0.028 (0.022)
Other 0.025 (0.028) 0.043 (0.029) 0.017 (0.036)
Married 0.013 (0.015) 0.025 (0.019) 0.000 (0.018)
Cohabiting -0.072* (0.031) -0.019 (0.036) -0.133** (0.037)
Separated -0.02 (0.039) 0.006 (0.051) -0.048 (0.059)
Human Capital
Specialist 0.082*** (0.019) 0.062** (0.017) 0.099** (0.026)
Top 20 LS 0.328*** (0.037) 0.34*** (0.034) 0.319*** (0.045)
Top 100 LS 0.135*** (0.025) 0.152*** (0.028) 0.121** (0.032)
Direct to LS -0.03† (0.014) -0.059** (0.020) -0.004 (0.021)
1999 graduate 0.078*** (0.019) 0.071** (0.022) 0.082** (0.025)
1998 graduate 0.128*** (0.030) 0.093 (0.059) 0.163*** (0.037)
Law Review 0.084*** (0.008) 0.076*** (0.011) 0.091*** (0.011)
Moot Court 0.024* (0.010) 0.028* (0.011) 0.021 (0.015)
First Position 0.044** (0.013) 0.055* (0.019) 0.034† (0.019)
Practice Setting
Bonus 0.243*** (0.022) 0.234*** (0.036) 0.258*** (0.026)
Govt. Employee -0.262*** (0.033) -0.278*** (0.038) -0.238*** (0.045)
I: Kids*Govt 0.007 (0.034) -0.034 (0.055) 0.03 (0.050)
Public Defender -0.447*** (0.042) -0.513*** (0.050) -0.337*** (0.057)
I: Kids*Public Def. 0.038 (0.055) 0.08 (0.081) -0.006 (0.059)
Nonprofit -0.59*** (0.052) -0.591*** (0.063) -0.574*** (0.077)
I: Kids*Nonprofit 0.08 (0.095) -0.02 (0.125) 0.28* (0.107)
In-House 0.106† (0.057) 0.053 (0.087) 0.177** (0.048)
I: Kids*In-House 0.072 (0.071) 0.095 (0.119) 0.014 (0.074)
Large law market 0.206** (0.053) 0.183** (0.051) 0.222** (0.061)
Major law market 0.29*** (0.041) 0.274*** (0.042) 0.304*** (0.048)
Discrimination (1-4) -0.025** (0.008) -0.021* (0.008) -0.036* (0.016)
Compensating Differentials
Hrs Worked 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
Ln(Hrs Worked) -0.063** (0.017) -0.074** (0.022) -0.063* (0.024)
Hrs Expected 0.007*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.006** (0.002)
Ln(Hrs Expected) -0.083† (0.040) -0.104* (0.041) -0.071 (0.043)
Vacation 0.044* (0.019) 0.041 (0.024) 0.046 (0.038)
Fulltime 0.369*** (0.059) 0.365*** (0.068) 0.426* (0.172)
Constant 10.385*** (0.132) 10.466*** (0.138) 10.3*** (0.264)
Observations 3,145 1,450 1,695
R-squared 0.56 0.59 0.53
Cluster 18 18 18
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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Table A.2: Multiple Regression Results with and without Influ-
ential Observations
Regression with Regression without
full sample influential observations
β (SE) β (SE)
Has Kids -0.010 (0.022) -0.008 (0.021)
Hrs worked 0.003** (0.001) 0.003* (0.001)
Ln(Hrs Worked) -0.074** (0.022) -0.069* (0.025)
Vacation 0.042† (0.024) 0.047† (0.024)
Hrs expected 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001)
Ln(Hrs Expected) -0.101* (0.042) -0.106* (0.044)
Fulltime 0.366*** (0.066) 0.344*** (0.067)
Bonus 0.234*** (0.036) 0.229*** (0.034)
Govt. Employee -0.284*** (0.038) -0.278*** (0.038)
Public Defender -0.495*** (0.045) -0.489*** (0.045)
Nonprofit -0.592*** (0.054) -0.584*** (0.052)
In-House 0.073 (0.079) 0.040 (0.060)
Specialist 0.063** (0.018) 0.075*** (0.014)
Discrimination (1-4) -0.021* (0.008) -0.020* (0.009)
Large law market 0.183** (0.051) 0.193** (0.049)
Major law market 0.275*** (0.042) 0.273*** (0.039)
Top 20 LS 0.338*** (0.034) 0.324*** (0.034)
Top 100 LS 0.152*** (0.028) 0.137*** (0.027)
Direct to LS -0.057* (0.020) -0.047* (0.021)
1999 graduate 0.071** (0.022) 0.058** (0.019)
1998 graduate 0.091 (0.058) 0.049 (0.048)
Law review 0.076*** (0.012) 0.075*** (0.012)
Moot court 0.028* (0.011) 0.025* (0.012)
First position 0.055* (0.019) 0.040* (0.018)
Age 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Black 0.042† (0.022) 0.052* (0.020)
Hispanic 0.002 (0.020) 0.009 (0.017)
Asian 0.042 (0.051) 0.031 (0.050)
Other 0.040 (0.029) 0.040 (0.029)
Married 0.024 (0.019) 0.018 (0.018)
Cohabiting -0.019 (0.036) -0.018 (0.035)
Separated 0.004 (0.052) -0.024 (0.053)
Constant 10.452*** (0.136) 10.506*** (0.139)
Observations 1450 1429
R-squared 0.59 0.60
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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APPENDIX B
WEIGHTED REGRESSION
Table B.1: First Stage Logit in
Weighted Regression
β (SE)
Hrs worked -0.018* (0.007)
Hrs expected -0.016 (0.011)
Fulltime -1.891*** (0.509)
Bonus 0.789** (0.263)
Govt. Employee 0.551 (0.323)
Public Defender 1.851*** (0.475)
Nonprofit 0.326 (0.495)
In-House -0.087 (0.398)
Top 20 LS -0.887** (0.279)
Top 100 LS -0.239 (0.209)
Direct to LS -0.178 (0.208)
1999 graduate -0.194 (0.202)
1998 graduate -0.263 (0.436)
Law review -0.077 (0.109)
Moot court 0.112 (0.144)
First position -0.058 (0.198)
Age 0.076*** (0.020)
Black 0.891* (0.374)
Hispanic 0.115 (0.353)
Asian -0.261 (0.353)
Other 0.287 (0.578)
Married 3.037*** (0.324)
Cohabiting 0.972 (0.722)
Separated 2.602*** (0.448)
Constant -3.072** (0.960)
N 1,450
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗p <
0.05, †p < 0.10
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics of Weights used in Weighted Regres-
sion
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sample Weights 1450 7.017926 4.496194 1.507462 22.39308
ATT Weights 1450 3.081572 7.504992 0.007443 194.6189
ATC Weights 1450 10.61061 27.3767 0.211337 588.364
Sample weights are provided by AJD; ATT and ATC weights are calculated using
the procedure presented in Methods.
Figure B.1: Kernel Density Overlap
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Table B.3: Weighted Regression in Common Support Utilizing Sample, ATT and
ATC Weights
CS Sample Weights CS ATT Weights CS ATC Weights
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Has Kids -0.001 (0.042) 0.01 (0.066) -0.089* (0.041)
Hrs Worked 0.002 (0.001) 0 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
Ln(Hrs Worked) -0.027 (0.030) 0.009 (0.066) -0.031 (0.045)
Hrs Expected 0.01*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.003)
Ln(Hrs Expected) -0.136* (0.051) -0.248** (0.070) -0.204** (0.055)
Fulltime 0.372*** (0.085) 0.355*** (0.075) 0.3* (0.118)
Bonus 0.19** (0.059) 0.129† (0.067) 0.237** (0.063)
Govt. Employee -0.254*** (0.060) -0.316*** (0.078) -0.157† (0.085)
I: Kids*Govt -0.065 (0.090) -0.033 (0.113) -0.08 (0.080)
Public Defender -0.539*** (0.070) -0.448*** (0.090) -0.424*** (0.070)
I: Kids*Public Def. 0.145* (0.065) -0.011 (0.091) 0.371** (0.120)
Nonprofit -0.527*** (0.089) -0.701*** (0.093) -0.436*** (0.105)
I: Kids*Nonprofit -0.018 (0.121) 0.152 (0.127) -0.164 (0.193)
In-House 0.168 (0.151) 0.128 (0.171) 0.204 (0.160)
I: Kids*In-House 0.043 (0.151) 0.097 (0.183) 0.166 (0.153)
Top 20 LS 0.281*** (0.043) 0.236** (0.076) 0.322*** (0.050)
Top 100 LS 0.133** (0.035) 0.109* (0.042) 0.092† (0.050)
Direct to LS -0.068* (0.024) -0.07* (0.028) -0.039 (0.031)
1999 graduate 0.062* (0.029) 0.101* (0.047) 0.025 (0.033)
1998 graduate 0.142† (0.071) 0.005 (0.069) -0.131 (0.120)
Law Review 0.084*** (0.013) 0.07*** (0.016) 0.109*** (0.020)
Moot Court 0.024 (0.017) 0.031 (0.021) 0.066* (0.025)
First Position 0.056† (0.030) 0.096 (0.057) -0.048 (0.038)
Age -0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
Black 0.035 (0.030) 0.105* (0.043) 0.137 (0.099)
Hispanic 0.001 (0.034) 0.045 (0.044) 0.099† (0.053)
Asian 0.036 (0.044) 0.153 (0.124) 0.106† (0.052)
Other 0.105** (0.035) 0.193** (0.050) 0.169† (0.097)
Married 0.046 (0.030) 0.123 (0.087) 0.136* (0.056)
Cohabiting 0.033 (0.051) -0.181 (0.114) -0.084 (0.078)
Separated 0.068 (0.054) 0.089 (0.097) 0.08 (0.104)
Vacation 0.046 (0.033) 0.077† (0.043) 0.069 (0.043)
Specialist 0.07** (0.021) 0.137*** (0.023) 0.051† (0.026)
Discrimination (1-4) -0.014 (0.011) -0.009 (0.021) -0.01 (0.018)
Large Law Market 0.181** (0.061) 0.223** (0.063) 0.19** (0.054)
Major Law Market 0.297*** (0.057) 0.326*** (0.070) 0.226** (0.065)
Constant 10.436*** (0.171) 10.454*** (0.174) 10.514*** (0.161)
Observations 1,167 1,167 1,167
R-squared 0.52 0.57 0.57
Cluster 18 18 18
These regressions are conducted in the area of common support where propensity scores overlap.
See B.1 for a visual representation.
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APPENDIX C
THE COUNTERFACTUAL APPROACH
In Lionel Shriver’s excellent novel, The Post-Birthday World, the protagonist is at a
birthday party for a close friend and her husband is unable to attend. At the end of the
night, she and the guest of honor find themselves in a romantic moment, moving towards
a kiss. Through the rest of the book, alternate chapters unfold the stories of two different
realities after that fateful night: one in which Irina did kiss the friend, and one in which
she did not. It is a counterfactual novel—if a researcher could simultaneously observe the
outcomes when an individual both does and does not “receive the treatment,” how much
easier social science would be!
The counterfactual tradition of causal inference seeks to explicitly lay out assumptions
regarding the effect of a particular treatment on a group’s outcomes, including issues of
selection into the group that either receives treatment or does not receive treatment. Coun-
terfactual analysis makes explicit our assumptions about treatment by utilizing the idea of
an “alternate world” in which we are able to know what the outcomes for those in the treat-
ment group would have been had they not received the treatment and, similarly, what the
outcomes would have been for those in the control group if they had received the treatment.
As an example, one could imagine private schools have higher test scores than public schools
because the types of students who attend private schools are more able or motivated to
perform at high levels, rather than private schools providing a better education for students
that are otherwise equivalent to those in public schools.
For the purposes of this study, the counterfactual approach makes explicit that having
children is not random; that those women who have children may be different than those
who do not and, consequently, their outcomes would have been different had they not had
children than the rest of women who chose not to have children. Similarly, women who did
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not plan to have children and had them anyway may face different outcomes than women
who both anticipated having and actually had children. The counterfactual approach notes
that lower wages for mothers may not be the average penalty applied across all women;
rather, it may be the penalty applied to women who intend to or already have children. In
order to estimate whether there is an average causal effect of children on all women’s salaries,
rather than just the effect of children on actual mothers’ salaries, additional work must be
done that explicitly lays out and adjusts for causal pathways.
Figure C.1: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
To do this, I draw on the counterfactual tradition of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)
to identify and address potential causal pathways through which a “treatment” (i.e., having
children) may impact the outcome variable (i.e., annual earnings). Using a DAG provides
the researcher with a visual representation of a mathematical model to help understand when
one can or cannot estimate a causal effect by evaluating all the causal pathways along which
variable influence may run. Figure C.1 is a simple DAG, in which A, B and C (the treatment
variable) all affect the outcome D. However, A not only affects D through C, but the dotted
line, between A and B means that there are unobserved factors that affect both A and B,
therefore A may also impact D through B through this “backdoor path.” Consequently, one
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must adjust for B in order to to ensure that one is able to identify the effect of C alone on
D, rather than C compounded with A and B. When one is able to adjust for all variables
and “block” backdoor paths along which the influence of those variables may travel, then
one may estimate a causal effect of the treatment on the outcome.
Figure C.2: Motherhood Penalty DAG
For our purposes, Figure C.2 is the DAG that demonstrates the causal pathways. In this
case, there are many factors that can influence salary, such as training, human capital, expe-
rience and organizational structure. I suspect that, in addition to other variables, children
impact wages; some of the factors that might influence fertility are age, sex, marital status
and other characteristics. Some factors that I would expect to influence both fertility and
wages would be unobserved factors such as ambition, professional commitment, and personal
work-life balance desires. In order to estimate the causal effect of children on wages, I must
control for not just the factors that affect wages directly, but also factors that could affect,
for example, both organizational characteristics and having children. Two examples are a
young married woman who chooses a job with no travel or a young single woman who wants
a family eventually but wants to establish herself professionally first in a high-workload envi-
ronment. These are considered the “backdoor paths” along which the relationship between
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the treatment and the outcome may be traced, as in C.3.
Figure C.3: Motherhood Penalty DAG with highlighted pathways
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